冯欣老师的合作论文被国际一流经济学期刊Journal of Public Economics接受发表

  我院冯欣老师与新加坡国立大学吕景峰教授的合作论文How to Split the Pie: Optimal Rewards in Dynamic Multi-Battle Competitions被国际一流经济学期刊Journal of Public Economics接受发表。



Abstract


Multi-battle competitions are ubiquitous in real life. In this paper, we examine the effort-maximizing reward design in sequentially played multi-battle competitions between two players. The organizer has a fixed prize budget, and rewards players contingent on the number of battles they win in a three-battle contest. A full spectrum of contest technologies in the Tullock family is accommodated. We find that the optimal design varies with the discriminatory power of the contest technology. In particular, when it is in the low range, winner-take-all is optimal. For the intermediate range, as discriminatory power increases, the optimal prize structure evolves continuously from winner-take-all to the proportional division rule due to the need to mitigate the growing momentum/discouragement effect. For the high range, a wide span of prize structures extracts full surplus and is thus optimal. Several robustness checks confirm that mitigating the momentum/discouragement effect is essential for effort-maximizing prize design in dynamic multi-battle contests.



内容简介


  文章采用Tullock竞赛技术对动态多场次竞赛模型中的奖励分配机制问题展开了分析。当奖励的分配是基于分赛的结果时,作者发现竞赛技术会直接影响最优奖励机制的设计:随着竞赛的准确程度逐渐增加,最优奖励机制将从“赢者独胜”逐渐变为“按比例分配”;而当竞赛趋近于业绩完全识别的竞赛类型时,最优奖励机制不再唯一,并且在最优机制下会出现全剩余提取的情况。文章通过对基准模型进行几个方面的扩展分析,确认了动态竞赛中的惯性/挫折效应是影响奖励分配机制的关键。



作者简介


  冯欣老师毕业于新加坡国立大学。主要研究领域为应用微观理论,包括竞赛理论、拍卖理论和产业组织理论,她的研究成果发表在Journal of Public Economics, Economics Letters经济学国际期刊上。